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ABSTRACT
Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund
managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap, which
is defined as the difference between the reported fund return and the return of a portfolio that invests
in the previously disclosed holdings after adjusting for expenses. Analyzing monthly return data on
more than 2,500 unique U.S. equity funds over the period 1984-2003, we document a substantial
cross-sectional heterogeneity and time-series persistence in the return gap, thus demonstrating that
unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of others destroy
value. Most important, we show that the return gap helps to predict future fund performance and
conclude that fund investors should use the return gap as an additional measure to evaluate the
performance of mutual funds.
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luzheng@umich.eduMutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers despite extensive disclosure 
requirements. They do not observe the exact timing of the purchases and the sales of securities 
and the corresponding transaction costs. On the one hand, fund investors bear hidden costs, such 
as trading costs,
1 agency costs,
2 and negative investor externalities.
3 On the other hand, they can 
benefit from unobserved interim trades by skilled fund managers who can use their informational 
advantage to time the purchases and the sales of individual stocks optimally.
4 In this paper, we 
test the hypothesis that past unobserved actions have a significant predictive power for future 
returns of mutual funds. 
We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap. The 
return gap is defined as the difference between the reported return of a fund to their investors and 
the return of a hypothetical buy and hold portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed 
holdings after adjusting for reported expense ratios. Our intuition behind this measure is 
straightforward: The impact of unobserved actions is captured in the investor return but not in 
the hypothetical return of the previously disclosed portfolio. For example, commissions paid by 
mutual funds to their brokers or stale-price arbitrage losses do not affect directly the returns of 
the holdings, but they do adversely affect the returns to investors, because these costs are 
effectively subtracted from the assets of a fund. On the other hand, if the interim trades of a fund 
create sufficient value, then we should observe that the disclosed fund return exceeds the return 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Livingston and O’Neal (1996); Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (1999); Wermers (2000); and 
Karceski, Livingston, and O’Neal (2005) for studies of the trading costs of mutual funds. Mahoney (2004) describes 
the various costs in more detail. 
2 See, for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and 
Reed (2002); Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2004); Meier and Schaumburg (2004); Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004); 
and Davis and Kim (2005). 
3 See, for example, Edelen (1999); Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000); Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and Rouwenhorst 
(2001); Greene and Hodges (2002); Rakowski (2002); Zitzewitz (2003); Johnson (2004); and Nanda, Wang, and 
Zheng (2005).  
4 See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993); Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997); Chen, 
Jagadeesh, Wermers (2000); and Ferson and Khang (2002).  
  2of a hypothetical portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed holdings. As a result, the 
return gap should be negatively related to the hidden costs and positively related to the hidden 
benefits of a mutual fund. 
One issue with using portfolio holdings data to evaluate fund manager performance is 
that the disclosed data reveal information only about the major equity positions on particular 
dates but do not indicate the exact purchase and sale dates. As a result, the exact holding period 
of securities is unknown. Furthermore, as shown by Meier and Schaumburg (2004), some funds 
window-dress their portfolios to hide their actual investment strategy from their investors or 
from competing funds. Thus, studies analyzing only the returns of the disclosed holdings might 
be subject to significant measurement error since they do not capture the impact of interim trades 
and various hidden costs. Our paper focuses on the difference between holdings and investor 
returns and argues that this difference captures important determinants of mutual fund 
performance, which cannot be detected by merely considering holdings returns. 
Even though estimating the impact of unobserved actions may serve as a helpful tool to 
evaluate mutual funds, an alternative and simpler way to judge any fund’s actions could be to 
just consider its net returns. We argue that, by benchmarking the investor returns against the 
holdings returns, we filter out the impact of common shocks to both returns and are able to 
obtain a more precise measure of the short-term unobserved actions.
5 Further, we hypothesize 
that if the unobserved actions are persistent over time, then the return gap is likely to contain 
relevant information about future fund performance. However, the return gap does not capture 
                                                 
5 An extensive literature examines the performance of mutual funds based on net returns and holdings returns. The 
studies based on net returns generally conclude that mutual funds underperform passive benchmarks. On the other 
hand, studies based on the holdings returns show that fund managers often have investment ability. Some papers on 
fund performance include Jensen (1968); Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993); Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1995); Malkiel (1995); Gruber (1996); Ferson and Schadt (1996); Carhart (1997); Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997); Chen, Jagadeesh, and Wermers (2000); Wermers (2000); Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001); 
  3longer-term investment abilities, such as longer-term abnormal performance due to active stock 
picking or style timing, which is captured by the established performance measures, e.g., one-
factor, three-factor, four-factor alphas and holding-based measures. 
Analyzing monthly return data on more than 2,500 unique U.S. equity funds over the 
period 1984-2003, we show that the average return gap is very close to zero. In particular, the 
value-weighted return gap for all mutual funds in our sample is –1.0 basis points per month, 
while the equally weighted return gap is 1.1 basis points per month. These results indicate that 
the magnitude of unobserved actions is relatively small in the aggregate sample. In contrast, we 
document a substantial cross-sectional variation in the return gap, indicating that hidden costs are 
more important for some funds while hidden benefits are more pronounced for other funds. We 
also find strong persistence in the return gap for up to five years ahead, which suggests that the 
return gap is driven by systematic factors. Moreover, we find persistence in the return gap not 
only for the worst performers, but also for the best performers. 
Consistent with our main hypothesis, we find that the past return gap helps to predict 
future fund performance. Funds with favorable past return gaps tend to perform consistently 
better before and after adjusting for differences in their risks and styles. Specifically, the decile 
portfolio of funds with the highest lagged return gap yields an average excess return of 1.2 
percent per year relative to the market return, whereas the decile portfolio of funds with the 
lowest return gap yields an average excess return of –2.2 percent per year. The return difference 
between the two portfolios is statistically and economically significant. To mitigate the potential 
impact of measurement error on the returns to our trading strategy we apply a simple filtering 
technique, originally proposed by Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005). The results using this 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and Wermers (2001); Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2004, 2005); Cohen, Coval, 
and Pástor (2005); Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2005); and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). 
  4method exhibit a substantial increase in the performance difference between the top and bottom 
deciles. Furthermore, their filtering technique allows us to identify mutual funds that 
significantly outperform passive benchmarks even after taking into account fund expenses. We 
confirm the relationship between a fund’s return gap and its subsequent performance via pooling 
regressions with clustered standard errors, controlling for other fund characteristics and time 
fixed effects. 
Next, we examine the determinants of the return gap. Consistent with our interpretation 
of the return gap, we find that trading costs are an important component of the return gap. 
Specifically, trading costs, estimated following Wermers (2000), reduce the returns to investors 
by about 60 basis points per year.  
Most funds in our sample exhibit a relatively large correlation between the hypothetical 
holdings returns and the investor returns, indicating that their actual investment strategies do not 
differ significantly from their disclosed strategies. However, some funds have relatively low 
correlations between holdings and investor returns. Since funds with low correlations are more 
opaque, unobserved actions are more important for these funds. Our results indicate that such 
opaque funds tend to exhibit particularly low return gaps. This result suggests that these funds 
are subject to more agency problems, which induce them to camouflage their effective portfolio 
strategies. 
Finally, we show that the return gap is positively related to the recent IPO holdings of a 
fund, suggesting the existence of cross-subsidization strategies among funds, as described by 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Reuter (2005). In addition, the return gap is related to 
other fund attributes, such as size, age, and average new money growth, which have been 
previously shown to affect fund performance. Further, we examine whether the return gap is 
  5related to funds’ trading securities between different industries and styles. We do not find a 
significant relationship between the industry and the style turnover and the return gap. 
Several papers have compared the reported fund returns to hypothetical fund returns 
based on disclosed portfolio holdings. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) is the first paper that 
compares reported fund returns to holdings returns. They use the difference to estimate the 
average fund transaction costs for a sample of 157 mutual funds during the period 1975 to 1984. 
They document that the average difference before subtracting fund expense ratio is about 1.68 
percent per year using Jensen’s alpha. The authors further point out that the estimated difference 
can also be affected by interim trades within a quarter and possible window dressing activities. 
Analyzing a large sample of diversified equity mutual fund for the period 1975 to 1994, 
Wermers (2000) decomposes fund performance into stock-picking talent, style selection, 
transaction costs, and expenses. He finds an average 2.3 percent difference between the gross 
returns of the hypothetical portfolio and the reported fund returns. He further indicates that 0.7 
percent of this difference is due to nonstock holdings and the remaining 1.6 percent is due to 
expenses, transaction costs and other unreported costs. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven 
(2004) show that “copy-cat” funds – funds that purchase the same assets as actively managed 
funds as soon as these asset holdings are disclosed – can earn returns net of expenses similar to 
those of the funds they are copying. More recently, Meier and Schaumburg (2004) compare the 
actual return of a fund with the return of a hypothetical portfolio based on the future holdings to 
investigate whether funds window-dress their portfolios to hide their actual investment strategy 
from their investors or from competing funds. Our paper differs from the above studies in that 
we primarily analyze the cross-sectional properties of the unobserved actions of mutual funds. 
Moreover, we investigate whether investors, when choosing mutual funds, could benefit from 
  6taking into account such unobserved actions. Finally, we analyze which fund characteristics 
affect these unobserved actions. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 motivates the use of the return gap in 
assessing the scope of unobserved actions and quantifies the return gap. Section 2 studies the 
impact of unobserved actions on future fund performance and discusses the economic 
significance of this predictability. Section 3 investigates the determinants of the return gap using 
a regression analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The Return Gap 
To uncover the role of unobserved actions, we define the return gap as the difference between 
the net investor return and the gross return of the fund holdings after adjusting for expenses. This 
section describes the computation of the return gap and summarizes the distribution of the return 
gap for our sample of mutual funds.  
 
1.1. Methodology 
The net return of the fund f at time t (RF) is computed as the relative change in the net asset 
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Fund managers subtract management fees and other expenses on a regular basis from the 
assets under management. Thus, these fees will reduce the total return of the investors, RF. 
  7On the other hand, the gross return of the fund’s holdings (RH) is defined as the total 
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If a fund discloses its holdings in the previous month, then the weights of the individual 
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On the other hand, if the holdings disclosure occurs more than one month prior to a 
specific month t, then we use the most recent holdings disclosed at time t-τ and update the 













































Based on the above, we define the return gap (RG) as a difference between net and gross 









t EXP RH RF RG − − = . (5) 
We adjust the difference in investor returns and holdings returns for expenses, because 
mutual funds have to disclose their expenses to their shareholders on a regular basis.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the investor returns and holdings returns have been 
previously compared by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Wermers (2000), Frank, Poterba, 
  8Shackelford, and Shoven (2004), and Meier and Schaumburg (2004). Meier and Schaumburg 
(2004) compute the difference between the investor returns and the hypothetical returns based on 
both the previous and the future holdings to investigate the prevalence of window-dressing in the 
mutual fund industry. In our paper, we report test results using the previously disclosed portfolio 
holdings to compute the holdings returns. We do not discuss the return gap using forward-
looking holdings because we want to compare the actual net fund returns to the returns of a 
passive strategy that continues to hold the previously disclosed securities.
6  
The return gap captures the unobserved actions of funds, which include hidden costs and 














Following Ferson and Khang (2002), we term one component of the unobserved actions 
the interim trading benefits of a fund. The interim trading benefits depend primarily on the 
profitability of the intermediate trades of a fund. Even though we can observe fund holdings only 
at specific points in time, funds may trade actively between these disclosure dates. If these 
interim trades create value, then the return of the fund (RF) will increase, while the return of the 
disclosed holdings (RH) will remain unaffected. For example, if a fund purchases a well-
performing stock, then the abnormal return will only be reflected in the return of the fund and not 
in the holdings return until the stock position is disclosed. Furthermore, if a fund obtains an IPO 
                                                 
6 In unreported tests, we also compute hypothetical portfolio returns based on the future holdings. We find that these 
forward-looking holding returns are, on average, about three percentage points per year higher than the backward-
looking holdings returns, because many mutual funds tend to invest in stocks that recently performed well either 
because they follow momentum strategies or because they window-dress their portfolios toward recent winners. We 
also find that the forward-looking holdings return is less correlated with the reported return than the backward-
looking holdings return, indicating that the backward-looking return is a better proxy of the effective holdings of a 
fund than the forward-looking return. We do not discuss these forward-looking holdings returns in more detail 
because of potential look-ahead biases. 
  9allocation, then the interim trading benefit will be positive on the first trading day if the market 
price of a newly listed stock increases relative to its IPO allocation price.  
The other component of the unobserved actions is the hidden costs of a fund, which 
include trading costs, commissions paid by the mutual fund to brokers, and potential agency 
costs. For example, funds that are subject to a higher price impact or funds that are exposed to 
higher commissions will have higher hidden costs. 
Neither the hidden costs nor the interim trading benefits of a mutual fund are observable, 
and therefore it is not possible to fully disentangle hidden costs and interim trading benefits. 
Thus, the primary interest of this study is the overall impact of unobserved actions. By analyzing 
the sign and the magnitude of the return gap, we can infer their relative importance for a given 
fund. Given that unobserved actions may have an impact on fund return one would expect that 
such actions, if persistent in a fund strategy, would have a significant predictive power for fund 
performance. 
 
1.2. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our sample is an updated version of the data used in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) and 
covers the time period between 1984 and 2003. The main set of data has been created by 
merging the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database with the CDA/Spectrum 
holdings database and the CRSP stock price data.  
The CRSP Mutual Fund Database includes information on fund returns, total net assets, 
different types of fees, investment objectives, and other fund characteristics. The CDA database 
provides stockholdings of mutual funds. The data are collected both from reports filed by mutual 
funds with the SEC and from voluntary reports generated by the funds. During most of our 
  10sample period, funds are required by law to disclose their holdings semi-annually. Nevertheless, 
about 49 percent of funds in our sample disclose their holdings quarterly.
7 Another 4.6 percent of 
our observations with valid CRSP data do not have available holdings data during the previous 
six months. In these cases, we compute the hypothetical holdings returns using the most recently 
available portfolio disclosures, assuming that fund managers follow buy and hold strategies 
between disclosure periods. We link each reported stock holding to the CRSP stock database.  
We start our matching process with a sample of all funds in the CRSP database. The 
focus of our analysis is on open-end domestic equity mutual funds, for which the holdings data 
are most complete and reliable. For that reason, we eliminate balanced, bond, money market, 
international, and sector funds, as well as funds not invested primarily in equity securities. Since 
different share classes have the same holdings composition, we aggregate all the observations 
pertaining to different share classes into one fund level observation.
8 We also exclude funds 
which hold less than 10 stocks and those which in the previous month manage less than $5 
million. Appendix A describes the details of the sample selection process. 
Our database does not include detailed information on the holdings of non-equity asset 
classes, such as cash holdings, bonds, and other asset classes. To mitigate this problem, we focus 
on domestic stock funds, primarily invested in common stocks, as described before. We also 
compute in each time period the proportion of the total fund value invested in five different 
classes of assets – equity, bonds, cash, preferred stocks, and other – and adjust the holdings 
returns to reflect non-equity holdings in the fund portfolio, as is further described in Appendix B. 
                                                 
7 Ge and Zheng (2005) investigate both the determinants and potential effects of portfolio disclosure frequency by 
comparing funds providing quarterly voluntary disclosure to funds providing only mandatory semiannual disclosure. 
8 For most variables, we use a value-weighted average for the fund level observation. For fund age, we use the 
maximum of all share classes. 
  11Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main fund attributes. Our sample includes 2,543 
distinct funds and 211,001 fund-month observations. Due to the substantial growth in the mutual 
fund industry over the last 20 years, we have significantly more funds in the more recent years of 
our sample period. The number of funds ranges from 244 (January 1984) to 1,816 (April 2002). 
We report summary statistics on fund total net assets (TNA), age, expenses, turnover, 
loads, the proportion of money invested in equity securities, and the new money growth. We 
define New Money Growth (NMG) as the growth rate of the assets under management (TNA) 
after adjusting for the appreciation of the assets of a mutual fund (R
f) assuming that all the cash 
flows are invested at the end of the period: 
9 
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1.3. Quantifying the Return Gap 
In this section, we quantify the return gap for funds included in our sample. Table 2 presents the 
value and the equally weighted averages of the return gap for our sample of funds between 1984 
and 2003. In the first row of Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2, we report the value-weighted (equally 
weighted) time-series averages, along with their corresponding standard errors in parentheses. 
The average net investor return, reported in Panel A, is equal to 0.988 percent per month 
or about 11.86 percent per year. On the other hand, the average return of a hypothetical portfolio 
that invests in the previously disclosed holdings amounts to 1.071 percent per month. The 
difference between the investor and the holdings return (i.e., the return gap before expenses) 
                                                 
9 For most of our sample period, we have TNAs available at a monthly frequency. However, until 1990 the TNA has 
only been available at a quarterly frequency. In this case, we compute the quarterly new money growth and divide it 
equally across the three months in each quarter. To diminish the impact of extreme outliers, we winsorize this 
variable at the one percent level. 
  12comes to –8.3 basis points per month or –1.0 percent per year. The average value-weighted 
expense ratio equals 0.07 percent per month or about 0.88 percent per year. The return gap after 
adjusting for disclosed expenses equals –1.0 basis points per month and is not significantly 
different from zero. Likewise, if we use equally weighted portfolio returns instead, the average 
return gap after expenses equals 1.1 basis points per month and is again not significantly 
different from zero, as reported in Panel B. In summary, we find that, in the aggregate sample, 
the return gap is very small, which is equivalent to saying that hidden costs are similar in 
magnitude to the benefits of interim trades. 
To examine whether the return gap is correlated with any risk or style factors, in Table 2 
we summarize the abnormal returns and the factor loadings using the one-factor CAPM, the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The Carhart 
model has the following specification: 
 R i,t – RF, t = αi + βi,M (RM,t – RF,t) + βi,SMB SMBt + βi,HML HMLt + βi,MOM MOMt + ei,t,    (8) 
where the dependent variable is the quarterly return on portfolio i in quarter t minus the risk-free 
rate, and the independent variables are given by the returns of the following four zero-investment 
factor portfolios. The term RMt – RFt denotes the excess return of the market portfolio over the 
risk-free rate;
10 SMB is the return difference between small and large capitalization stocks; HML 
is the return difference between high and low book-to-market stocks; and MOM is the return 
difference between stocks with high and low past returns.
11 The intercept of the model, αi, is the 
Carhart measure of abnormal performance. The CAPM model uses only the market factor, and 
                                                 
10 The market return is calculated as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks using the 
CRSP database. The monthly return of the one-month Treasury bill rate is obtained from Ibbotson Associates. 
11 The size, the value, and the momentum factor returns were taken from Kenneth French’s Web site  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library. 
  13the Fama and French model uses the first three factors. Based on the results in Table 2, we 
conclude that the general conclusions regarding the return gap are not affected if we account for 
return components that are due to common risk or style factors in fund returns. 
 
1.4. Persistence of the Return Gap 
Many features of the unobserved actions indicate that such actions should be persistent. For 
example, if fund governance is weak in one period because of stale price arbitrage or cross-
subsidization, it is likely to remain poor in the next period. 
To test this hypothesis formally, we sort all funds in our sample into deciles according to 
their lagged return gap and compute the average return gap during the subsequent month by 
weighting all funds in each decile equally. Table 3 reports the raw and the abnormal four-factor 
return gap of decile portfolios formed according to the average return gap during the previous 
one-, three-, and five-year interval. The first column shows that funds in the worst return gap 
decile, based on the previous 12 months, generate an average return gap before expenses of          
–11.3 basis points in the subsequent month. On the other hand, funds in the best return gap decile 
generate an average return gap of 15.4 basis points. The difference in the return gap between the 
two extreme deciles and between the top five and the bottom five deciles is economically and 
statistically highly significant. Furthermore, the average return gaps are almost monotonic for the 
deciles, as is indicated by the high value of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
The persistence pattern remains similar if we sort funds according to longer-term past 
return gaps, as shown in the second and the third columns. The last three columns indicate that 
the persistence findings remain unchanged, even if we adjust the fund returns for the four 
common factors of Carhart (1997). These results show that funds with positive return gaps tend 
  14to have persistently higher interim trading benefits than hidden costs. The opposite is true for 
funds with negative return gaps.
12 
To provide evidence on long-term stability of the observed patterns, we also track the 
persistence of the return gap over the subsequent five years and compute the respective average 
monthly return gap. Figure 1 depicts the future return gaps for decile portfolios formed according 
to the average return gap during the 12 months prior to the portfolio formation. Panel A reports 
the raw return gap, while Panel B additionally adjusts the gap for common factors in stock 
returns. The figure demonstrates that the raw return gap is also remarkably persistent over longer 
time periods. The ranking of the decile portfolios, based on the raw return gap, in the year after 
the formation period remains identical to that in the formation period. Although we find some 
evidence for reversion towards the mean for the extreme deciles, the persistence of both top and 
bottom performers remains over the longer term.
13 
Carhart (1997) shows that performance persistence is not significant for well-performing 
funds after one accounts for possible momentum effects.
14 Contrary to his finding regarding the 
lack of persistence using four-factor alpha, we find that the abnormal return gap remains 
persistent in both tails of the return gap distribution even after controlling for momentum and 
other common factors in stock returns, as shown in Panel B. Hence, our results cannot be fully 
explained by differences in common factors in interim trading benefits. One reason may be that 
                                                 
12 Persistent return gaps might result just because of persistent differences in the disclosure frequencies of mutual 
funds. However, this potential problem does not affect our persistence results. We continue to find significant levels 
of persistence if we only consider funds that disclosed their holdings within the last three months and ignore funds 
that did not disclose their holdings during the last three months. 
13 The return gaps in the first period after the portfolio formation differ between Figure 1 and Table 3 because they 
cover a different estimation window. Figure 1 gives the average return gap over the whole year after the portfolio 
formation, while Table 3 reports the monthly return gap in the month after the portfolio formation to avoid 
overlapping observations. For example, funds in the top return gap decile based on the previous 12 months have an 
average return gap of 15.4 basis points during the first month after the portfolio formation (Table 3) and an average 
monthly return gap of 12.1 basis points during the first year after the portfolio formation (Figure 1).  
  15by measuring the investor returns relative to the holding returns we filter out the impact of 
common shocks to both returns and thus are able to focus on a more persistent component of 
fund returns. 
 
2. Predictability of Future Fund Performance 
Until now, we have provided evidence that the return gap has interesting properties that are 
consistent with its potential of being a good predictor of future fund performance. In this section, 
we test the main hypothesis of our paper, i.e., whether unobserved actions indeed contain 
valuable information that could be used to predict future fund performance. Given that the return 
gap is a persistent phenomenon, we should expect that funds with higher return gaps (i.e., those 
with more beneficial unobserved actions) outperform funds with lower return gaps in the future. 
 
2.1. Trading Strategy Using the Return Gap 
Our first predictability test examines the performance of a trading strategy based on the past 
return gap. Specifically, we sort all funds in our sample into deciles, according to their average 
lagged return gap during a one-year period. Subsequently, we compute the average returns in the 
following month by weighting all the funds in a decile equally. 
In general, the holdings are not disclosed immediately after the effective holdings date. 
For example, Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven (2004) document that funds publicly 
disclose their holdings with a time delay. In light of their findings, we introduce an additional 
three-month lag in the return gap before implementing a trading strategy. This implies that the 
return of the tenth decile portfolio in January 2003 is based on the 10 percent of funds that had 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 See Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993); Brown and Goetzmann (1995); Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996); 
  16the highest return gap between October 2001 and September 2002. Including this additional 
implementation lag reduces the profitability of our trading strategy slightly, because there 
appears to be a mean-reversion in the return gap, as indicated in Figure 1. 
In Table 4, we report the risk- and style-adjusted net returns for each decile portfolio. 
Funds in the first decile have an average return gap of –59.8 basis points per month during the 12 
months prior to the portfolio formation. On the other hand, funds in the tenth decile have an 
average return gap of 65.7 basis points per month during the formation period.  
The first five performance measures are based on the fund-reported returns, and the last 
two measures are based on the fund holdings returns. The first column reports excess returns of 
the deciles relative to the market portfolio. The next four columns report the intercepts from a 
time-series regression based on the one-factor CAPM model, the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993), the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), and the conditional four-factor model of 
Ferson and Schadt (1996).
15 The two holding-based performance measures are the selectivity 
measure (CS) of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW) (1997) and the benchmark-
free performance measure of Grinblatt and Titman (GT) (1993).
16 
We observe that funds with the most favorable past return gaps (decile ten) tend to 
significantly outperform funds with the least favorable past return gaps (decile one) in the 
subsequent month. Investing in the decile-ten funds would have generated an additional excess 
                                                                                                                                                             
Carhart (1997); Bollen and Busse (2005); and Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) for studies on the persistence 
of mutual funds. 
15 For the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model, we regress the return of a portfolio of mutual funds on the 
four Carhart (1997) factors and interaction terms between the four factors and five demeaned lagged macro-
economic variables. Consistent with the previous studies, we consider the following five macro-economic variables: 
the one-month Treasury bill yield, the dividend yield of the S&P 500 Index, the Treasury yield spread (long- minus 
short-term bonds), the quality spread in the corporate bond market (low- minus high-grade bonds), and an indicator 
variable for the month of January. 
16 The benchmark returns for the DGTW performance measures were obtained from Russ Wermer’s Web site at 
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm. The benchmark assignments are 
  17return of 28.4 basis points per month or about 3.41 percent per year compared to investing in the 
decile-one funds. The relationship between past return gaps and future performance is highly 
monotonic, which is confirmed by the high value of the Spearman rank correlation.
17 Our results 
are not influenced substantially by the variation in the risk or style factors, as reported in the next 
three columns. Also, controlling for the conditioning macroeconomic information, as suggested 
by Ferson and Schadt (1996), does not adversely affect our findings.
18  
The results, though still statistically significant, become a little weaker if we consider the 
remaining two, holding-based measures. This is plausible since the holdings returns do not 
reflect any of the factors that drive the hidden costs of mutual funds and also ignore the interim 
trading benefits. Nevertheless, these results still show a positive relationship between the 
holding-based performance measures and the return gap, thus indicating that funds that appear to 
have skills based on their disclosed trades also tend to have more favorable return gaps. Panel A 
of Figure 2 presents a graphical illustration of the results discussed above. 
All the performance measures for the top decile funds are positive, but many are not 
statistically significantly positive. However, the trades of these funds create value that 
compensates investors at least for the expenses and the trading costs of the funds. Thus, our 
results indicate that the top decile funds perform at least as well as passive benchmarks even 
after adjusting for portfolio management costs. 
To analyze the time-series performance of this trading strategy, we compute the average 
annual returns of each decile in each year. In the untabulated results, we find that the top five 
                                                                                                                                                             
conducted as described on page 7 of Wermers (2004), which is a slight modification to the original assignments in 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).  
17 The results are qualitatively unaffected if we compute the average returns over the entire year after the portfolio 
formation, as opposed to calculating them in the subsequent month after the portfolio formation. We report the latter 
to avoid overlapping return observations. 
  18return gap decile funds outperform the bottom five return gap decile funds in 18 of 20 years (all 
years except 1992 and 2003), indicating that the relationship between the return gap and future 
performance is relatively stable over time.  
The spread in the adjusted performance widens further if we form 20 portfolios based on 
the lagged return gap. The difference in the excess return relative to the market between the top 
and the bottom five percent of funds amounts to 38.5 basis points, as compared to 28.4 basis 
points for the difference in the decile portfolios. The difference in the Carhart abnormal returns 
between extreme portfolios also increases from 22.4 to 34.4 basis points per month using 20 
instead of 10 return gap portfolios. 
Investors cannot short-sell mutual funds, and therefore it is not feasible for them to obtain 
the returns given by the difference between the top and the bottom deciles. However, by 
conditioning on the return gap investors can avoid potential losses that are proportional to the 
return differences between the deciles. 
 
2.2. Trading Strategy with Back-Testing 
In a recent study, Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) provide empirical evidence that 
previous performance studies are plagued by estimation problems. Since many sorting criteria 
are measured with noise, the top and the bottom deciles of a trading strategy might not just be 
populated by the best and the worst funds, but also by funds which have the highest estimation 
errors. To alleviate this problem, they suggest using a back-testing technique, in which the 
statistical model is required to exhibit some past predictive success for a particular fund before it 
is used to make predictions in the current period. They show that a strategy that uses modest ex-
                                                                                                                                                             
18 Farnsworth, Ferson, Jackson, and Todd (2002) show that many stochastic discount factor models have a mild 
negative bias when performance is neutral. The average bias is about -0.19% per month for the unconditional 
  19ante filters to eliminate funds whose parameters likely derive primarily from estimation errors 
produces very significant out of sample risk-adjusted returns. 
Motivated by their study, we apply a back-testing technique with the view of eliminating 
the funds with the most severe measurement errors. In the first step, we sort all funds into deciles 
according to their average return gap between 15 and four months prior to the portfolio 
formation month. This sort yields exactly the same portfolios as those described in Table 4. In 
addition, we require that the average reported excess return of a fund relative to the market 
during the three months immediately prior to the portfolio formation has the same sign as the 
lagged return gap. Thus, funds are only considered in the trading strategy if there is a 
concordance between the lagged return gap and the lagged excess return. 
Our results – summarized in Table 5 – show that the performance difference between the 
top and the bottom return gap decile portfolios widens dramatically for all performance 
measures. For example, the difference in the abnormal four-factor return increases from 22.4 
basis points per month to 54.6 basis points per month. We also observe that the differences in the 
two holding-based performance measures become larger and statistically more significant.  
After filtering out funds that are more likely to suffer from measurement problems, we 
find that the funds in the top return gap decile perform particularly well. The abnormal returns of 
the top decile range between 1.12 (Ferson-Schadt) and 4.67 (Fama-French) percent per year. All 
abnormal returns are now significantly positive except for the Ferson and Schadt measure. 
 
2.3. Trading Strategies Using Alternative Selection Criteria 
To check the robustness of our results, Table 6 reports the abnormal four-factor returns of decile 
portfolios of mutual funds based on various portfolio formation criteria. Panel A reports the 
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models and -0.12% per month for conditional models. results formed by sorting the mutual funds according to different measures of the return gap, and 
Panel B also includes the findings based on the back-testing method suggested by Mamaysky, 
Spiegel, and Zhang (2005). 
The first columns of Panels A and B simply repeat as a benchmark the performance 
differences of portfolios formed according to the return gap and are therefore identical to the 
performance measures in the fourth columns of Tables 4 and 5. The second and the third 
columns report the performance results by forming portfolios using the return gaps over the 
previous 36 and 60 months as the portfolio formation criterion. The results remain qualitatively 
unaffected using the alternative formation windows. 
The fourth columns report results sorting funds according to their return gap before 
expenses, which is defined as the raw return gap minus the monthly expenses. This measure 
corresponds to the total gap between investor returns and hypothetical holdings returns. Taking 
into account expenses improves the performance of decile ten relative to decile one only slightly. 
Finally, in calculating returns on our strategies we do not take into account the loads that 
need to be paid to purchase respective funds. Perhaps high return gap funds also have high loads, 
which subsequently could reduce overall performance of the proposed strategies. To assess the 
robustness of our results to this possibility we exclude load funds and form decile portfolios 
based on the return gap. The results remain qualitatively similar to our earlier evidence and are 
summarized in the last column. 
 
2.4. Regression Approach 
This section uses a pooling regression approach to confirm that the return gap has a predictive 
power for future excess and abnormal returns, controlling for other fund-specific characteristics. 
  21Table 7 summarizes the estimates of the coefficients with the dependent variables being the 
excess return of a mutual fund about the market return, the one-factor abnormal return, the three-
factor Fama and French (1993) abnormal return, and the four-factor Carhart (1997) abnormal 
return, respectively. The factor loadings are estimated by regressing the fund returns on the 
common factors during a 36-month window prior to the relevant monthly observation. Thus, the 
abnormal return regressions have fewer observations than the excess return regression. In 
addition, all regressions include time fixed effects and the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering by time.
19 We take the natural logarithms of the age and size variables to mitigate the 
impact of right skewness in the distributions of both variables. 
The results, reported in Table 7, demonstrate that the return gap has an important impact 
on future fund performance, even after controlling for other fund characteristics and for time 
fixed effects. For example, using a four-factor model, a one standard deviation increase in the 
past return gap (0.44 percent per month) increases the future fund return by approximately 9.49 
basis points per month or about 1.14 percent per year. Lagged expenses and lagged excess 
holdings returns also exhibit a significant impact on the three- and four-factor adjusted returns. 
For example, a one standard deviation increase in monthly expenses (0.04 percent per month) 
decreases the four-factor abnormal return by 7.63 basis points, and a one standard deviation 
increase in excess holdings return (1.21 percent per month) increases the four-factor abnormal 
return by 17.61 basis points per month. 
The sign of the remaining coefficients is consistent with the existing evidence. For 
example, we find a negative relationship between size and fund performance, confirming Chen, 
Hong, Huang, and Kubik’s (2004) diseconomies of scale argument. On the other hand, age, 
                                                 
19 We also compute the coefficient estimates using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. Since the results do 
not differ significantly across the two methods, for brevity, we only report results using a pooling regression. A 
  22turnover, and the index fund indicator variable play a secondary role.
20 We conclude that apart 
from other characteristics, such as past returns, expenses, turnover, TNA, and age, fund investors 
also should take into account the return gap when selecting funds. 
 
3. Determinants of the Return Gap 
This section provides further justification for using the return gap as a measure for unobserved 
actions by looking at its association with various indicators related to hidden costs and benefits 
applying a multivariate regression framework. We find that the return gap has a significant cross-
sectional variation and is related to many factors that proxy for unobserved actions. 
We analyze the different determinants using a pooling regression of the return gap on the 
various fund characteristics. Each regression additionally includes time fixed effects. We 
estimate the pooling regressions with clustered standard errors to account for a possible 
contemporaneous correlation structure.
21 
Table 8 summarizes the regression results for four specifications. The first two columns 
use the raw return gaps as the dependent variables, whereas the last two columns use the 
abnormal four factor-adjusted return gaps as the dependent variables. Like in the previous 
section, we use three years of past monthly return gaps to estimate the coefficients of the four-
factor Carhart (1997) model. Subsequently, we subtract the expected return from the realized 
fund return to determine the abnormal return gap of a fund in each month. Given that the risk-
adjusted measure of each individual fund requires at least three years of data we lose the first 
three years of fund returns. Furthermore, two specifications include the mutual fund family size 
                                                                                                                                                             
comparison of the two methods can be found in Petersen (2005). 
20 We identify index funds by their names using the CRSP mutual fund data set.  
21 The results using Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) methodology are similar and available upon request. 
  23as an additional variable. This variable is available from the CRSP mutual fund database only 
after 1991. 
The first variable we consider is the trading costs of a mutual fund. We follow Wermers 
(2000) and compute the execution costs of mutual funds, based on the results of Keim and 
Madhavan (1997), who use proprietary data to compute total execution costs (commissions and 
market impact) for a sample of institutional investors between 1991 and 1993. Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) estimate the cross-sectional dependence of total institutional trading costs on 
the market in which a stock is traded, the size of the trade, the market capitalization, the price of 
the stock, and whether the trade is a purchase or sell transaction. In Appendix C, we describe the 
procedure to estimate the trading costs in more detail. We estimate average execution costs to be 
at 5 basis points per month or at about 0.60 percent per year. Our estimates of trading costs are 
consistent with the estimates in Wermers (2000) during the periods when both data overlap. The 
magnitude of our trading costs also is consistent with the magnitude of trading costs estimated by 
Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (1999), who use spread costs and commission costs for a sample 
of 132 funds between 1984 and 1991. In particular, between 1984 and 1991 we obtain trading 
costs of 0.72 percent as compared to 0.78 percent documented in their study. 
Funds with higher trading costs should perform worse, unless the interim trading benefits 
offset their trading costs. We document a negative relationship between trading costs and the 
return gap both before and after adjusting for common risk factors. The coefficient estimates on 
the trading costs are statistically significantly different from zero, but they are not significantly 
different from –1. A coefficient of –1 implies that an increase in the trading costs of 10 basis 
points also will reduce the return gap by 10 basis points. Thus, as expected, trading costs have an 
important impact on the return gap.  
  24Another variable we consider is the fund IPO allocations. Due to their incentive to 
maximize family level profit, fund families may allocate IPOs strategically to subsidize certain 
funds in the family (Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2004; Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang, 2004; 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005; Reuter, 2005). As a result, we expect funds that obtain more 
IPO allocations to exhibit a more favorable return gap since the IPO allocations tend to be 
significantly underpriced. Although we do not know which funds obtain IPO allocations directly, 
we observe stocks that go public and are subsequently held by mutual funds. On each disclosure 
date, we compute the weight of companies that went public and are held by a fund. The fund 
might have obtained these stocks through an IPO allocation or it might have obtained them on 
the open market subsequent to the IPO. An average mutual fund holds 1.3 percent of its assets in 
companies that went public during the previous disclosure period. The median proportion of IPO 
stocks held is close to zero, and a relatively small fraction of funds account for most of the IPO 
holdings.  
We find a strong relationship between this variable and the return gap, indicating that 
funds that own stocks immediately after they go public have particularly favorable return gaps 
during this time interval. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that these funds obtain 
favorable IPO allocations, which result in significant first-day trading profits. The coefficient 
estimate implies that a one-percent increase in holding of IPO stocks increases the return gap by 
23.3 basis points, which is generally consistent with the average underpricing during this time 
period.
22 The IPO variable remains significant, even after adjusting the return gap for common 
factors in fund returns using the Carhart (1997) model. 
                                                 
22 For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) show that the average first-day return of IPOs between 1980 and 2001 
amounts to 18.8 percent.  
  25The third variable that we consider measures the transparency of the holdings disclosure 
and is defined as the correlation coefficient between monthly holdings and investor returns 
during the previous year. We argue that funds with a lower correlation between holdings and 
investor returns tend to follow investment strategies that are more opaque. Investigating 
unobserved actions of these funds is thus of considerable importance. The low correlation can 
result from high turnover and from window dressing, which is a fairly common practice in the 
mutual fund sector, as described by Meier and Schaumburg (2004). If the low correlation is due 
to agency problems, then we should observe low-correlation funds to perform worse. On the 
other hand, if the low correlation is driven by managers opting to hide their valuable investment 
ideas, then we should find that low-correlation funds perform better. We find a significantly 
positive relationship between the correlation and the return gap. This result suggests that the 
opaqueness of a fund might be a good proxy for agency problems, which, in turn, adversely 
affect the fund performance. 
Next, we examine the relationship between the return gap and other fund characteristics 
that the existing literature has shown to affect fund returns, including fund expenses, turnover, 
size, age, expenses, new money growth, the standard deviation of the fund returns, holdings 
characteristics of the funds, and an indicator variable for index funds. We observe that funds do 
not compensate for their higher expenses by either having lower hidden costs or higher interim 
trading benefits. In fact, we find a significantly negative relationship between expenses and the 
raw return gap. 
An alternative way to assess the impact of trading activities is to look at the relationship 
between turnover and the return gap. We do not find a significant relationship between turnover 
and the return gap. An insignificant correlation between turnover and the return gap, however, 
  26does not necessarily imply that trading costs are not significantly related to turnover. It is 
possible that portfolio turnover also has a positive association with the interim trading benefits. 
For example, existing studies (e.g., Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002) argue that turnover may proxy 
for the unobserved managerial skills. Consequently, these two effects may be offsetting each 
other. 
Consistent with Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), we find that smaller funds and 
larger fund families tend to exhibit more favorable return gaps.
23 We find that the age of a fund 
is negatively related to its return gap. However, the effect of age on the return gap is relatively 
small. Consistent with the “smart-money” effect in Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999), we find a 
significant and positive relationship between the mean lagged money flow and the return gap. It 
has been shown in the literature that liquidity demand of investors can negatively affect fund 
performance.
24 However, we do not find a significant relationship between the volatility of the 
fund returns and the return gap.  
The characteristics of the stocks held by a fund may have a significant impact on the 
return gap. To capture potential style differences between mutual funds we follow Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2005) and group the holdings according to their size, value, and momentum 
characteristics. Each stock traded on the major U.S. exchanges is grouped into respective 
quintiles according to its market value, its book-to-market ratio, and the lagged one-year return. 
Subsequently, using the quintile information, we compute the value-weighted size, value, and 
momentum score for each mutual fund in each period.
25 For example, a mutual fund that invests 
                                                 
23 In their theoretical models, Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) and Berk and Green (2004) exploit the notion 
of decreasing returns to scale of mutual funds.  
24 See, for example, Edelen (1999); Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and Rouwenhorst (2001); Rakowski (2002); Zitzewitz 
(2003); Johnson (2004); and Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2005). 
25 The book-to-market and the momentum quintiles are formed by dividing the stocks equally into the five groups. 
On the other hand, the size quintiles are formed by using cut-offs from the NYSE only.  
  27only in stocks in the smallest size quintile would have a size score of 1, while a mutual fund that 
invests only in the largest size quintile would have a size score of 5. 
The regression results indicate that funds focusing on large and momentum stocks tend to 
have worse return gaps before and after controlling for the four Carhart (1997) risk factors. This 
result might be caused by the fact that profitable interim trading opportunities are less prevalent 
or hidden costs are higher in these style classes.  
In unreported tests, we also investigate whether funds that turn over their portfolios 
between different industries and styles exhibit superior or inferior return gaps. However, we do 
not find a significant relationship between the return gap and the industry or the style turnover. 
Finally, we find that index funds tend to have worse return gaps than actively managed 
funds.
26 Index funds have only very limited opportunities to create value through interim trades, 
and the return gap reflects primarily the hidden costs of fund management. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Mutual fund investors must make investment decisions based on publicly available information. 
It is well known that market participants cannot entirely observe several fund actions. These 
actions may benefit or hurt investors, thus, learning about them may help investors to evaluate 
funds more accurately. 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the unobserved actions on the fund performance 
using a large sample of U.S. equity mutual funds between 1984 and 2003. We estimate the 
impact of unobserved actions by taking the difference between the net investor returns and the 
                                                 
26 This result is driven primarily by small index funds. The Vanguard 500 Index Fund, which has been the largest 
index fund, has an average positive return gap of 0.66 basis points per month, whereas other index funds have an 
average return gap of -1.93 basis points per month. The surprisingly large heterogeneity in index funds has been 
described by Elton, Gruber, Busse (2004) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2004). 
  28buy and hold returns of the portfolio disclosed in the most recent past. This difference – termed 
the return gap – presents us with several interesting findings. First, the effect of unobserved 
actions is persistent in the long run both for bottom and top performing funds. Second, funds 
differ substantially with respect to the impact of such actions. Most important, the cross-sectional 
difference in unobserved actions has a significant predictive power for future performance, 
indicating that funds with value-enhancing unobserved actions outperform funds whose 
unobserved actions predominantly reflect hidden costs. 
Our paper offers several implications for the mutual fund industry. First, fund investors 
can make more informed fund selection decisions if they take into account the unobserved 
actions of mutual funds. Second, the existence of systematic differences in the scope of the 
unobserved actions among funds raises concerns for funds with persistently large negative return 
gaps. This is especially important in light of the fact that funds with negative actions adversely 
affect investors’ return on funds. 
  29APPENDIX 
A. Sample Selection 
We start our matching process with a sample of all mutual funds in the CRSP mutual fund 
database covering the period between 1984 and 2003. The focus of our analysis is on domestic 
equity mutual funds, for which the holdings data are the most complete and reliable. As a result, 
we eliminate balanced, bond, money market, sector, and international funds, as well as funds not 
invested primarily in equity securities. We base our selection criteria on the objective codes and 
on the disclosed asset compositions. First, we select funds with the following ICDI objectives: 
AG, GI, LG, or IN. If a fund does not have any of the above ICDI objectives, we select funds 
with the following Strategic Insight objectives: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or SCG. If a fund 
has neither the Strategic Insight nor the ICDI objective, then we go to the Wiesenberger Fund 
Type Code and pick funds with the following objectives: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, 
MCG, and SCG. If none of these objectives are available and the fund has the CS policy 
(Common Stocks are the mainly held securities by the fund), then the fund will be included. We 
exclude funds that have the following Investment Objective Codes in the Spectrum Database: 
International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced. Since the reported objectives 
do not always indicate whether fund portfolio is balanced or not, we also exclude funds that, on 
average, hold less than 80 percent or more than 105 percent in stocks.  
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2004) identify a form of survival bias in the 
CRSP mutual fund database, which results from a strategy used by fund families to enhance their 
return histories. Fund families might incubate several private funds and they will only make 
public the track record of the surviving incubated funds, while the returns for those funds that are 
terminated are not made public. To address this incubation bias, we exclude the observations 
  30where the year for the observation is prior to the reported fund starting year and we exclude 
observations where the names of the funds are missing in the CRSP database. Data may be 
reported prior to the year of fund organization if a fund is incubated before it is made publicly 
available; and these funds might not report their names or some other fund attributes, as shown 
by Evans (2004). Incubated funds also tend to be smaller, which motivates us to exclude funds 
that had in the previous month less than $5 million in assets under management.  
In the next step, we are able to match about 94 percent of the CRSP funds to the 
Spectrum database. The unmatched funds tend to be younger and smaller than the funds for 
which we find data in Spectrum. As previously mentioned by Wermers (2000), the Spectrum 
data set often does not have any holdings data available during the first few quarters listed in the 
CRSP database.  
Mutual fund families introduced different share classes in the 1990s, as discussed in 
Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004). Since different share classes have the same holdings 
composition, we aggregate all the observations pertaining to different share classes into one 
observation. For the qualitative attributes of funds (e.g., name, objectives, year of origination), 
we retain the observation of the oldest fund. For the total net assets under management (TNA), 
we sum the TNAs of the different share classes. Finally, for the other quantitative attributes of 
funds (e.g., return, expenses, loads), we take the weighted averages of the attributes of the 
individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs of the individual share classes. 
The aggregation of multiple share classes reduces our sample size to 3,171 unique funds. 
For most of our sample period, mutual funds were required to disclose their holdings 
semi-annually. A large number of funds disclose their holdings quarterly, while a small number 
of funds have gaps between holding disclosure dates of more than six months. To fill these gaps, 
  31we impute the holdings of missing quarters using the most recently available holdings, assuming 
that mutual funds follow a buy-and-hold strategy. In our sample, 72 percent of the observations 
are from the most recent quarter and less than 5 percent of the holdings are more than two 
quarters old. We exclude funds who have fewer than 10 identified stock positions and whose 
holdings are more than three quarters old. This final selection criterion reduces the number of 
mutual funds used in this study to 2,543 funds. 
 
B. Non-Equity Holdings 
The holdings database includes only common stock positions and excludes other non-equity 
holdings. Mutual funds in our sample invest on average 93.16 percent of their assets in equity 
securities and considerably less in cash or cash equivalents (5.51 percent). Finally, the 
percentage holdings of bonds (0.75 percent), preferred stocks (0.24 percent), and other assets 
(0.33 percent) are relatively minor. 
To adjust fund holdings returns for the returns on the various asset classes, we proxy for 
the returns of these assets using published indices. For bonds, we use the total return of the 
Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index, while for cash holdings we use the Treasury bill rate.
27 
No reliable index returns are available for preferred stocks and for other asset classes. Thus, we 
assume that the return on preferred stocks equals the return of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate 
Bond Index, and the return on other assets equals the Treasury bill rate.
28 
                                                 
27 Data on the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index are obtained from Datastream, and the risk-free interest is 
obtained from French’s Web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french .  
28 We also have tried two other methods of adjustment. In the first method, we calculate the implied returns on 
different asset classes in each month by regressing the return of a fund on the weights invested in the five asset 
classes (equity, bonds, preferred stocks, cash, and other). The coefficients are estimates of the imputed returns of the 
different asset classes. We find that these imputed returns are highly correlated with the returns of the corresponding 
index returns. The second method adjusts the returns by estimating abnormal returns using various factor models, 
such as the CAPM model, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), or the four-factor model of Carhart 
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C. Trading Costs 
We follow Wermers (2000) in estimating the execution costs of mutual funds. He bases his 
estimate on Keim and Madhavan (1997), who provide fitted regressions for total institutional 
execution costs (commissions and market impact) for a sample of investors between 1991 and 
1993. The execution costs are estimated separately for the costs of buying and selling stocks. The 
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The total costs (in percentage of the trade value) of a given purchase and sale transaction 
of stock i in quarter t are denoted by and . TradeSize denotes the dollar value of a 
trade divided by the market capitalization of the stock; MktCap denotes the market capitalization 
of the stock (expressed in thousands);    is the stock price; and    is an indicator 
variable of whether the stock is traded on NASDAQ. Monthly execution costs are obtained by 
dividing the quarterly costs equally over the three months.
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(1997). These models are believed to adjust appropriately for cash holdings or other factors captured in the various 
models. The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use an alternative method. 
29 Unlike Wermers (2000), we do not adjust the trading costs by a year factor, since consistent measures of trading 
costs are not available for our whole sample period. However, our estimates of the trading results are not affected 
significantly if we adjust the trading costs with a year factor. One alternative specification we used to estimate 
trading costs adjusts the annual trading costs by the time-series of the aggregate execution costs on the different 
markets (NYSE and NASDAQ) from Stoll (1995) between 1984-1992 and the time-series of the execution costs 
between 1992-2004 as obtained from Abel/Noser. The means (standard deviations) of the two alternative measures 
of trading costs are very similar and equal 4.80 (5.52) basis points per month for the unadjusted measure and 5.02 
(5.91) basis points for the adjusted measure using Stoll and Abel/Noser. The correlation between the two measures 
is 97.09 percent, indicating that the adjustment has a very minor impact on estimated trading costs.  
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  37Figure 1 
Persistence of the Return Gap  
This figure depicts the average return gap of portfolios tracked over a five-year period for the period 1984 and 2003. 
The return gap is defined as the difference between the net investor return and the holding return of the portfolio 
disclosed in the previous period and is expressed in percent per month. The portfolios are formed by sorting all the 
funds into deciles according to their initial return gap during the previous year. Subsequently, each portfolio is 
tracked over the next five-year period. In Panel A, we report the raw return gap, and in Panel B we report the return 
adjusted for the four factor Carhart (1997) model.  
 
















































































  38Figure 2  
Returns of Trading Strategies 
This figure shows the average abnormal returns during the month following the formation period over the period 
1984 and 2003, expressed in percent per month. The decile portfolios are formed based on the previous one-year 
return gap (Panel A) and on the previous one-year return gap using the back-testing technique of Mamaysky, 
Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) (Panel B), where decile one has the lowest return gap and decile ten has the highest 
return gap. We use four measures of abnormal returns – the return in excess of the market return; the market-
adjusted abnormal return (CAPM); the three-factor adjusted return as in Fama and French (1993); and the four-
factor adjusted return as in Carhart (1997). 
 












































































































  39Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of equity mutual funds over the period 1984 to 2003. 
 
 Mean  Median  Standard  Deviation 
Number of distinct mutual funds 
 
2,543    
Number of fund-month observations 
 
     211,001     
Number of funds per month 
 
879 720   
TNA (Total Net Assets) (in Millions) 
 
952 166  3,771 
Age 
 
13.49 8  13.98 
Expense Ratio (in Percent) 
 
1.24 1.20 0.44 
Turnover Ratio (in Percent) 
 
88.06 65.00  103.51 
Maximum Total Load (in Percent) 
 
2.10 0.28 2.52 
Proportion Invested in Equity  
(in Percent) 
93.16 95.22  7.72 
Mean of Prior-Year New Money Growth  
(in Percent per month; 1% winsorized) 
2.50 0.35 9.45 
40Table 2 
Performance of Investor and Holdings Returns 
This table summarizes the investor returns, the holdings returns before and after subtracting expenses, and the return 
gaps before and after subtracting expenses for the value- and equally weighted portfolio of all funds in our sample 
over the period 1984 to 2003. The return gap has been defined as the difference between the investor return and the 
holdings return of the portfolio disclosed in the previous period. We report the raw returns, the one-factor alpha of 
Jensen (1968), the three-factor alpha of Fama and French (1993), and the four-factor alpha of Carhart (1997) to 
measure fund performance. The returns are expressed in percent per month and the standard errors are summarized 
in parentheses. 
 
  Investor Return  Holdings Return  Return Gap 
    Before Expenses  After Expenses  Before Expenses  After Expenses 
 





















































*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 






















































Persistence of the Return Gap  
This table reports the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) of the current return gaps for decile portfolios 
of the mutual funds sorted by their average lagged return gaps during the previous one, three, and five years over the 
period 1984 to 2003. The return gap is defined as the difference between the reported return and the holding return 
of the portfolio disclosed in the previous period. The first three columns summarize the raw return gaps, and the last 
three columns show the four-factor abnormal return gaps as in Carhart (1997). The returns are expressed in percent 
per month. The table also calculates the differences in the return gaps between the top and the bottom deciles and the 
top and the bottom halves, along with the Spearman rank correlations and the corresponding p-values in parentheses. 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
  Raw Return Gap  
 
Abnormal Return Gap  
Using Four-Factor Model 
Estimation 
Window 
1 Year  
 






































































































































































































Portfolio Returns Based on the Return Gap 
This table reports the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) for deciles of mutual funds sorted according to 
the lagged one-year return gap over the period 1984 to 2003. The return gap is lagged for one additional quarter to 
account for the possible delay in reporting the holdings. The return gap is defined as the difference between the 
investor fund return and the return based on the previous holdings. We use the excess return over the market, the 
one-factor alpha of Jensen (1968), the three-factor alpha of Fama and French (1993), the four-factor alpha of Carhart 
(1997), and the Ferson-Schadt (1996) conditional measure based on the four-factor model to measure fund 
performance. Moreover, we report the Characteristic Selectivity (CS) measure of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997), and the Grinblatt and Titman (1993) performance measure. The returns are expressed in percent 
per month. The table also reports the differences in the return gaps between the top and the bottom deciles and the 
top and the bottom halves, along with the Spearman rank correlations and the corresponding p-values in parentheses. 















































































































































































































































Portfolio Returns Based on the Return Gap with Back-Testing 
This table reports the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) for deciles of mutual funds over the period 
1984 to 2003 sorted according to the lagged one-year return gap with back-testing as suggested by Mamaysky, 
Spiegel, and Zhang (2005). Mutual funds are sorted into deciles according to the average return gaps between fifteen 
and four months prior to the portfolio formation. In addition, funds are only considered if the sign of the average 
return gap equals the sign of the excess reported fund return during the three months prior to the portfolio formation. 
We use the performance measures described in Table 4. The returns are expressed in percent per month. 
















































































































































































































































Portfolio Returns Based on the Return Gap: 
Various Sorting Criteria 
This table reports the abnormal returns according to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), along with their 
standard errors (in parentheses), for deciles of mutual funds formed according to different sorting criteria over the 
period 1984 to 2003. Panel A sorts the funds according to the lagged return gap between fifteen and four months 
prior to the portfolio formation. Panel B uses in addition the back-testing technique suggested by Mamaysky, 
Spiegel, and Zhang (2005), by considering only funds if the sign of the average return gap equals the sign of the 
excess reported fund return during the three months prior to the portfolio formation. The returns are expressed in 
percent per month. 
 
Panel A: Sorting According to Lagged Return Gap Measures 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 










Before Expenses  
1 Year 












































































































































































45Panel B: Sorting According to Lagged Return Gap Measures with Back-Testing  
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
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Predictability of Future Returns Using Return Gap and Holdings Return 
This table reports the coefficients of pooling regressions of excess and abnormal returns on various fund attributes. 
The sample includes all equity mutual funds in our sample and spans the period of 1984-2003 (including the data used 
for calculating the abnormal returns). The dependent variables are the market excess return, the one-factor abnormal 
return, the three-factor abnormal return of Fama and French (1993), and the four-factor abnormal return of Carhart 
(1997), respectively. All regressions include time dummies. Cluster-corrected standard errors have been provided in 
parentheses. The returns are expressed in percent per month.  
 































































































YES YES YES 








Determinants of the Return Gap 
This table reports the coefficients of the panel regressions of the return gaps on various fund and fund family 
characteristics. The sample includes equity mutual funds and spans the period of 1984-2003. The return gap is defined 
as the difference between the investor fund return and the return based on the previous holdings. All regressions 
include time-fixed effect dummies. The standard errors take into account clustering by time and are provided in 
parentheses. The returns are expressed in percent per month. 
*** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance 
  Dependent Variables (in Percent per Month) 
 Raw 
Return Gap 
Abnormal Four-Factor  
Return Gap 








































































































































Time Fixed Effects 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 
 
167,983 145,328 117,130  97,788 
48